We apply a fallback model of coalition formation to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, focusing on the seven natural courts, which had the same members for at least two 
Introduction
In this paper we apply a fallback model of coalition formation, whereby players "fall back" on their preferences to form majority coalitions, to the U.S. Supreme Court. 1 The preference of each justice for every other justice as a coalition partner is assumed to be revealed by his or her level of agreement with that justice-the greater this level, the higher a justice ranks another justice as a coalition partner.
The rankings of each justice by every other are the data we use to predict which majority coalitions form on different natural courts, which have the same members over one or more terms. 2 We cover the 40-year span, beginning with Warren E. Burger's appointment as chief justice in 1969 and ending with the retirement of David Souter in 2009. By holding constant the members of a court, we eliminate the influence that different members may have on the decision to join a coalition.
But more than predicting majority coalitions, the fallback model finds smaller subcoalitions that form on their way to becoming either a majority coalition or a nonmajority opposition coalition. Explaining the process of coalition formation is just as important as predicting the final division of the court because, without understanding the process, one cannot fully understand the forces that produced a decision.
We do not assume that the justices, based on their voting records, can be scaled along a single liberal-conservative dimension. Although we respect the efforts of Martin 1 The first application of this model was to bargaining (Brams and Kilgour, 2001) , wherein the assent of all players (i.e., unanimity) was assumed. More recent applications have been to voting Kilgour, 2002, 2005; Brams and Kilgour, 2011) , wherein a simple-majority or qualified-majority rule is assumed. The application analyzed in section 2 is briefly discussed in Brams and Kilgour (2011) , which mainly provides a theoretical analysis of kingmakers and leaders when the preferences of players are ordinally or cardinally single-peaked (not true of the Supreme Court, as we will show). 2 A term of the Supreme Court begins in October and ends in June or July of the next year.
and Quinn (2002) , and others before them, to situate justices along a single ideological dimension, the coalitions that one can infer from the Martin-Quinn scales of the natural courts do a poor job of predicting minimal majority coalitions (i.e., in 5-4 decisions). By contrast, the fallback model's predictions are far more accurate and, in addition, help explain, even when one side's subcoalitions are tighter than the other's ("tightness" will be discussed and illustrated later), why they may fail to jell into a majority coalition.
The success of the fallback model's predictions stems in part from its not assuming that there is a single underlying dimension along which members can be arrayed.
Because the justices' views on the different issues that come before the court are complex, a model that takes into account this complexity is needed not only to make good predictions but also to explain finer cleavages on the court.
The fallback model, on occasion, predicts the formation of more than one majority coalition. In those cases, we identify the members common to these different coalitions, whom we call kingmakers because, if they agree, they can decide which majority coalition forms. 3 The leader of a fallback coalition is the first member, as less preferred coalition partners are added to form a majority coalition, to be acceptable to all its members. As with kingmakers, there may be more than one leader, who may also be a kingmaker. As we show, justices who are both kingmakers and leaders not only determine which majority coalition forms but also tend to be moderates in the majority coalition.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the fallback model by applying it to the 2005-2009 natural court. Because the next natural court, which began 3 We could, as well, use the term "queenmaker" instead of "kingmaker." With no intention of favoring one gender or the other, we use the latter term for convenience.
with the appointment of Sonia Sotomayor and ended with the retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens and the subsequent appointment of Justice Elena Kagan in 2010, lasted only one term, we exclude it from the analysis. We also exclude all natural courts between 1969 and 2009 that had a duration of less than two terms to ensure that there are sufficient cases to establish a regular pattern of behavior.
In section 3 we apply the fallback model to the six natural courts, lasting at least two terms, that preceded the 2005-2009 court. We compare the fallback coalitions that formed on these courts with those occurring most often in 5-4 decisions of each natural court.
In section 4 we draw comparisons across the natural courts. Among other findings, we show that chief justices are often but not always leaders. This suggests that they use their power of assigning cases to good effect when they are in the majority.
Kingmakers occur on two natural courts, and some are also leaders. Finally, we identify three justices whose views changed over the course of their tenure, leading to their exclusion from the majority coalitions most likely to form.
The fallback model offers a moving picture of individuals merging into subcoalitions, and these in turn merging into majority coalitions, culminating in the emergence of kingmakers or leaders. While this moving picture is implicit in the justices' agreement scores, the fallback model succinctly and accurately reveals the dynamics of coalition formation that earlier models have not delineated.
Application of the Fallback Model to the 2005-2009 Natural Court
In the November issues of the Harvard Law Review each year, statistics are given on the percent agreement of each justice with every other justice on "full-opinion decisions" involving "substantial legal reasoning" in the previous term of the Supreme Court. Using these statistics, which are given by a 9 The subcoalitions that form at each level, up to the two simple-majority fallback coalitions of five justices that form at level 6 (in boldface), are shown in Table 2 . The fallback process that yields these coalitions unfolds as follows: 3. Continue the descent to lower and lower levels of preference, creating subcoalitions of justices-all of whose members find each other acceptable at that level-until one or more majority coalitions (of at least five members) forms for the first time. These coalition(s) are the fallback coalition(s).
We do not show in Table 2 proper subsets of subcoalitions that form at each level.
For example, the subcoalition of four members at level 3, (Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens), contains several proper subsets of two and three members that did not form either at level 1 or level 2. A case in point is (Breyer, Ginsberg), whose members rank each other 2 nd and 3 rd , respectively. Because such subsets are contained in (Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens) at level 3, we do not list them at this level. Thomas's ranking and Stevens's ranking of justices in Table 1 are not diametrically opposed, the agreement-score ordering is not ordinally single-peaked.
A cardinally single-peaked ordering is not only ordinally single-peaked but also one in which the justices can be placed at points, from left to right, on the real line. The MQ scores force such a placement but, as we have shown, this placement is not consistent with the justices' agreement scores, and the ranking of the justices derived therefrom (shown in Table 1 ). Edelman and Chen (2007) provide evidence that a single dimension, like that given by the MQ scores, is insufficient to explain the voting behavior of the justices, but their focus is less on coalition formation and more on the power of individual justices to alter outcomes. Kaniovski and Leech (2009) Much rarer is the 5-person middle-of-the-road coalition of (Alito, Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, Souter) that is also predicted by the fallback model at level 6. In fact, this coalition formed only twice (2.8 percent of the 5-4 cases) over the 4-year period of the natural court. 6 We conclude that neither the 5-person minimal-diameter liberal coalition, nor the 5-person middle-of-the-road fallback coalition, is a good predictor of 5-4 Supreme Court decisions. However, the second 5-person conservative fallback coalition is a good predictor, so it behooves us to look more closely at which of the two fallback coalitions at level 6 (see Table 2 ) is more likely to form.
Observe that Alito, Kennedy, and Roberts are the common members of the two coalitions. This renders these justices kingmakers, who can decide which one they prefer. Since the middle-of-the-road coalition hardly ever formed, the real contest is between the liberal and conservative coalitions. Because Kennedy, the most liberal of the conservatives, prefers Roberts and Alito to Breyer and Souter, and Scalia and Thomas to Ginsburg and Stevens (see Table 1 ), the fallback model predicts that he will side with the conservatives. 7
Among not only the kingmakers but also the two other members of the conservative 5-person coalition, Roberts, the chief justice, is the only member acceptable at level 2 and, hence, the leader (underscored); 8 the four other members become acceptable only at level 3 (Alito), level 4 (Kennedy), level 5 (Scalia), or level 6 (Thomas) 6 Coincidentally, this is the unique prediction of the fallback model when it is applied to the MQ scores.
(We do not give these rankings here, but they can be readily calculated from the MQ scores in the manner illustrated earlier.) Because these rankings imply-falsely, based on the agreement-score rankings-that the justices' preferences are cardinally single-peaked, we did not apply the fallback model to them for any of the six natural courts analyzed in section 3. 7 Note that Kennedy's preferences are not unequivocal: He does not prefer all the conservatives to all the liberals but has pairwise preferences (e.g., prefers Roberts and Alito to Breyer and Souter, and Scalia and Thomas to Ginsburg and Stevens). Of course, the facts and nature of a case also matter, leading Kennedy, on occasion, to side with the liberals. 8 Roberts is also the leader of the fallback coalition that includes Breyer and Souter, because he is the first member of this coalition to become acceptable to all the other members (albeit only at level 5).
to all the other coalition members. This makes Roberts a natural bridge among the members, supporting the frequently made observation that not only did the conservative coalition hold sway in 2005-2009 but also that Roberts was the driving force behind it (Stearns, 2008; Toobin, 2008; Liptak, 2009 Liptak, , 2010 . He, along with Alito and Scalia, is a middle member of it, which is anchored on the left by Kennedy and on the right by
Thomas.
The fallback model gives insight into why the liberals, by and large, failed. The tight 4-person liberal subcoalition that formed at level 3 could not attract a fifth member at either level 4 or level 5, when different conservative 4-person subcoalitions emerged.
Critically, the liberal coalition's best prospect, Kennedy, ranked the extreme liberals, Ginsburg and Stevens, below the extreme conservatives, Scalia and Thomas, so it is hardly surprising that Kennedy more often sided with the conservatives.
Coalition Formation on Six Earlier Natural Courts
In this section we give the agreement-score rankings (as in Table 1 ), and the subcoalitions and fallback coalitions (as in Table 2 ), for the six natural courts that had durations of at least two terms between 1969 and 2005. We compare these with the minimal-diameter majority coalitions and comment briefly on the predictions of these different models in the 5-4 decisions of the court. 9 The minimal-diameter coalition (see Table 4 ) is a left-of-center coalition, ranging from Kennedy on the right to Ginsburg on the left, which formed in only one of the 193 5-4 decisions (0.5 percent). By contrast the conservative coalition predicted by the fallback model prevailed in 86 of these decisions (44.6 percent). The major change from 1994-2005 is that there is no 5-person fallback coalition but, instead, two 6-person fallback coalitions, which are the same except that Scalia is a member of one and Souter a member of the other. The five justices common to these coalitions are kingmakers and include Rehnquist; once again, he is a leader, acceptable to all five other members of each fallback coalition at level 2 in the coalition that includes Scalia, and at level 3 in the coalition that includes Souter. In the latter coalition, Kennedy is also a leader, so both of these justices are underscored in Table 6 .
1994-2005

1991-1993
Because Rehnquist ranks Scalia 4 th and Souter 6 th , one would expect the fallback coalition that includes Scalia to form more often in 6-3 decisions. We do not have relative-frequency data on 6-person coalitions that occurred, but for the 32 5-4 decisions, it turns out that 10 (31.3 percent) include a subset of the 6-person coalition that includes Scalia, whereas none (0 percent) includes a subset of the 6-person coalition that includes Souter, making the six most conservative justices the better prediction.
Interestingly, three different 4-person subcoalitions, which are subsumed by one or both of the 6-person fallback coalitions, appear at levels 4 and 5. The two justices that make no appearance in any of these subcoalitions, or in the two fallback coalitions, are Blackmun and Stevens, the two most liberal justices according to their MQ scores.
The minimal-diameter coalition (see Table 6 ) is a right-of-center coalitionexcluding only Scalia-ranging from Rehnquist on the right to O'Connor on the left. It formed in none of the 32 5-4 decisions (0 percent). The conservative fallback coalition has two leaders, Rehnquist and Kennedy, who are both acceptable to the other members at level 2. This pair were also leaders in one of the two fallback coalitions in the 1991-1993 court. That they are each other's top coalition partners (i.e., at level 1) helps to explain why they share leadership of the unique fallback coalition on this court.
1987-1989
Of the 45 5-4 decisions, the conservative fallback coalition prevailed in 26 (57.8 percent). By contrast, the middle-of-the-road minimal-diameter coalition (see Table 8), with O'Connor on the right and Blackmun on the left, formed in none (0 percent). The court at the first three levels bifurcates into conservative and liberal subcoalitions, some of which duplicate those on the earlier court. This court includes three Richard Nixon appointees-Powell, Blackmun, and Burger-the latter being the chief justice.
1981-1986
At level 4, a unique 5-person fallback coalition emerges that admits Byron White, a justice ranked 4 th by all its other members, and no lower than 4 th by the four other justices. Once again, a chief justice, Warren E. Burger, is the leader of the conservative coalition, who becomes acceptable to all fallback coalition members at level 2.
Of the 147 5-4 decisions, the fallback coalition prevailed in 38 (25.9 percent), which is more than any other 5-person majority. By contrast, the middle-of-the-road minimal-diameter coalition (see Table 10 ), with O'Connor on the right and Stevens on the left, formed in no cases (0 percent). This court takes five levels to find two 5-person fallback coalitions, four of whose members are common and, therefore, kingmakers. Stewart is the fifth member of one of these coalitions, Blackmun of the other. In the fallback coalition that includes Stewart, the chief justice (Burger) is not a leader; instead, Powell is the unique leader, who becomes acceptable to all other members at level 2. However, in the fallback coalition that includes Blackmun, Burger and Powell share leadership at level 3.
1976-1980
Both Powell and Burger, as kingmakers and leaders, prefer Stewart to Blackmun, so the fallback model predicts the conservative coalition that includes Stewart will form more frequently in 5-4 decisions. In fact, this court majority formed in 9 (7.1 percent), and the second fallback coalition in 20 (15.9 percent), of the 126 5-4 decisions; however, these were the two most common 5-4 majorities to form.
By contrast, the minimal-diameter coalition is again a middle-of-the-road coalition (see Table 12 ), with Powell on the right and Stevens on the left. It formed in no cases (0 percent). The leaders of the fallback coalition that includes Stewart do not include the chief justice (Burger). Instead, the leaders are Blackmun and Powell, each of whom finds all the other members acceptable at level 3. However, Burger is the unique leader in the fallback coalition that includes White, finding all members of this coalition acceptable at level 2.
1971-1974
Because Burger and Blackmun favor White over Stewart, whereas only Powell favors Stewart over White, the fallback model predicts that the fallback coalition with White will form more frequently in 5-4 decisions. The 126 5-4 decisions bear out this prediction: The coalition with White formed in 37 cases (37.4 percent), and that with Stewart in 16 cases (16.2 percent), which were the most common 5-4 majorities to form.
As usual, the minimal-diameter coalition is a middle-of-the-road coalition, with Powell on the right and Stevens on the left. It formed in no cases (0 percent).
Summary and Conclusions
Using the pairwise agreement scores of each justice with every other, we determined the rankings by each justice of every other as a coalition partner. We then applied the fallback model to these rankings, which showed the build-up of subcoalitions into majority fallback coalitions, wherein each justice considers the other members of a subcoalition or fallback coalition acceptable at a designated level. Whereas mutually acceptable pairs of justices form at level 1, it takes 4-6 levels before a majority fallback coalition emerges in the seven natural courts we analyzed.
If more than one fallback coalition emerges, the common members are kingmakers. The leader(s) are the members who are the first to become acceptable to all other members of a fallback coalition. We found that the chief justice is often a leader, sometimes sharing his leadership with another member, but occasionally other justices become leaders. Thus, for example, Warren Burger, as one of the more conservative members of his court, was not always a leader; when this happened, he was replaced by a more centrist member of his fallback coalition.
We compared fallback predictions with minimal-diameter predictions, based on MQ scores, which force the justices to have cardinally single-peaked preferences.
Because these scores do not mirror some of the subtleties of the justices' rankings, it is not surprising that their frequent predictions of middle-of-the-road coalitions are not bourn out in the 5-4 cases. 10 The main cleavage in the past 40 years has been between the conservatives and the liberals. For the most part, the conservatives, led by conservative chief justices (Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts), have prevailed. By comparison, the Warren court that preceded these courts was generally considered to be liberal.
The fact that the fallback model uses the votes of the justices to predict the coalitions that they formed might appear to be tautological. We would point out, however, that the MQ scores use the same data, and they perform poorly in predicting majority coalitions, at least based on the minimal-diameter criterion.
The fallback model, it should be emphasized, does not predict just a final outcome but also shows the build-up of subcoalitions along the way, offering a moving picture of coalition formation. Included in this picture is information on the tightness of the subcoaltions, because the earlier they form, the greater the affinity of their members for each other. Likewise for fallback coalitions-those that form at level 4 are more cohesive than those that form at level 6.
One might decry the fact that middle-of-the-road coalitions are the exception rather than the norm. But it should be remembered that a significant number of Supreme Court decisions are 9-0 or 8-1; there are fewer 7-2 decisions and then more 6-3 and 5-4 decisions, with 5-4 and 9-0 decisions the most frequent. 11 While the court is in theory a nonpartisan body, its members are appointed by Democratic and Republican presidents, which is generally reflected in the liberal and conservative leanings of the justices.
But there are exceptions, which the fallback coalitions reveal. Blackmun, Souter, and Stevens, when they first joined the Supreme Court, were relatively conservative; all were members of the fallback coalitions that formed. But over the years they became more liberal and lost their memberships in these conservative coalitions.
In conclusion, the fallback model provides a dynamic and realistic portrait of the Supreme Court over the past 40 years. Whether or not the dominance of the conservatives will prevail may well depend on whether Barack Obama, if he wins a second term as president in 2012, is able to shift the balance on the court.
